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Evidence from Italy shows that electoral reforms can often
have the opposite effect of what is intended.
Blog Admin
The current Italian electoral law, passed in 2005, has been criticised on the basis that it is
likely to produce an unstable government, with different parties in control of the two
chambers of the Italian parliament. Massimo Bordignon and Andrea Monticini assess
the effects of electoral reforms by studying a previous change to the Italian electoral system:
the partial adoption of ‘first past the post’ voting in 1993. They write that while the reform
was aimed at making governments more stable, and reducing the number of smaller
parties, the new system largely had the opposite effect. It is important to recognise that the
reality of electoral reform can often be very different from its original intention.
Among polit ical institutions, the most widely studied is certainly the electoral rule (or
voting system). In polit ical science, a large body of  literature exists which attempts to
connect the f eatures of  the electoral rule with the optimal number of  parties and
candidates. Economists have also developed several models explaining policy and
economic outcomes as the result of  the contrasting incentives generated by dif f erent
electoral systems. This f ocus seems to be justif ied on empirical grounds. According to
Torsten Person and Guido Tabellini’s extensive empirical analysis, f or example, the electoral rule is the
“key” polit ical institution: all other things being equal, a switch f rom proportional voting to plurality rule
should generate an impressive decrease in public spending of  5 per cent of  GDP.
This analysis, however, as with many others addressing similar relationships between the electoral
system and economic outcomes, is based on comparisons across countries that dif f er along many other
dimensions beyond the electoral rule. Whichever clever devices one can imagine f or trying to identif y a
causal ef f ect, there always remains the doubt that the relationship between the electoral rule and the
outcome of  interest may be generated by some other uncontrolled f actor that “causes” both the
electoral rule and the outcome. Besides, ref orms of  the electoral system are in reality rare events, so we
generally lack the kind of  variation that could help us in identif ying causal ef f ects.
This suggests that to get more convincing
evidence one should instead try to
concentrate on the f ew examples of
electoral ref orm inside a single country,
where other f actors are likely to have less
of  an impact. On this basis, we discuss
here the ef f ects of  an important ref orm
introduced in Italy in 1993 (and then
repealed again in 2005). This ref orm
changed the electoral rule f or the national
parliament, moving it f rom a pure
proportional system to a mixed electoral
one, where 75 per cent of  the seats were
assigned through plurality rule in single
candidate districts and the rest by
proportional voting. The ref orm,
somewhat imposed on the Italian
parliament by the results of  a national
ref erendum, had, according to its
advocates, several objectives. The f irst and f oremost was to increase the accountability of  parties and
polit icians, f orcing them to f orm pre-electoral coalit ions on well-def ined policy platf orms. But it was also
expected that the ref orm would solve some long term problems of  the Italian party system, such as the
excessive f ragmentation of  the polit ical landscape and the short duration of  governments and
legislatures. The majoritarian prize in the single district would f orce the dif f erent parties to merge
together and eliminate the smaller and more extreme parties f rom the polit ical arena. The stability of
governments and legislatures would raise as the electoral cost f or parties to dissolve existing coalit ions
(once they were f ormed) would increase.
Accordingly, we compare here bef ore and af ter ref orm values f or several variables capturing these
expectations, such as the number of  parties represented in Parliament, the number of  parties in the
ruling coalit ion, the duration of  governments and of  legislatures and the seats of  the major party in the
ruling coalit ion. We collect data f or all Italian polit ical elections between 1948 and 2001. Over this period,
there were 14 general elections: 11 under proportional representation, and 3 under the mixed electoral
system. In total, 55 governments were in of f ice during the period: 47 bef ore the 1993 electoral ref orm
and 8 af ter the ref orm. In our analysis we compare the average value of  the indicator under the
proportional electoral rule with the (average) variation induced by switching to the plurality rule. The
results are reported in table 1 below (a more detailed discussion of  the f indings is available here).
Table 1: Effect of the 1993 Italian Electoral Reform
Only two indicators are statistically signif icant: the number of  seats of  the majority party and the number
of  parties in the coalit ion government. The number of  seats of  the majority party decreased by 94 (on
average) seats and the number of  parties in the coalit ion government increased by 2 af ter the ref orm.
This means that, contrary to its main objectives, the ref orm did not af f ect either the stability of
governments (legislatures) or the f ragmentation of  the polit ical system. It had, however, the ef f ect of
making the ruling coalit ions more unstable, increasing the number of  parties inside it and reducing the
role and the importance of  the major party. This was again against expectations.
Our results may be interpreted in dif f erent ways. Possibly, the Italian ref orm was ill designed to reach its
objectives, and possibly, Italian polit icians and parties were smart enough to f ind ways to circumvent the
constraints introduced by the ref orm. But it is still surprising that none of  the expected and plausible
ef f ects of  the ref orm did actually take place and what happened (if  anything) was that results went in the
opposite direction to expectations. It is also true that the ref orm had been in place only brief ly. One could
argue that the time period was indeed too short to af f ect the behaviour of  voters, who did not have the
time to learn and understand the new rules. But this argument is not entirely convincing. First, in a longer
time span many other things also change, making it more dif f icult to identif y the ef f ect of  a ref orm.
Second, even in our limited time span, we could not f ind any tendency f or our variables to move in the
direction expected by the ref orm. Contrary to the main perspectives of  the literature surveyed, the Italian
experience suggests extreme caution in predicting the ef f ects of  a ref orm of  the electoral rule, even on
the polit ical variables that should be more directly inf luenced by the electoral system.
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